"At the Direction of the President, we will defeat adversaries at the time, place, and in the manner of our choosing -setting the conditions for future security". 
Foucault's 'society of security': towards a biopolitical critique of the war on terror
What does it mean to place 'life' at the centre of political inquiry? What is achieved in this move?
Is it possible to speak of a 'spatiality of biopolitics', which not only pays attention to scale but also to the complex constellation of sovereign and biopolitical power? And if so, is it helpful any longer to speak of 'biopolitics' and 'geopolitics' separately? In recent years, such questions have featured prominently in reflections across the social sciences that have sought to theorise the relations between 'territory' and 'sovereign power', 'populations' and 'biopolitical power'. 7 Though 'biopolitics' is a much contested term, deployed differently in an array of contexts, a key focus of examination in the increasingly extensive literature on the subject has nonetheless been on the spatial politics through which life is constituted and governed; in other words, how life is incorporated into modern forms of governmentality. And this, of course, is a particularly geographical concern.
For geographers, putting 'life' at the centre of political critique poses a number of intriguing theoretical challenges that have been taken up in a variety of ways. 8 Many have drawn on the work of Foucault and particularly his recently translated lectures on security, territory and population at new "society of security" was enabled by "making the old armatures of the law and discipline function". 13 The new regulatory "apparatuses (dispositifs) of security" reflected for Foucault a shift in the sovereign's concerns from: "the safety of his territory" to the "security of the population";
from "what limit to impose" to "facilitating the proper circulation of people"; from traditional "sovereign power" to modern "biopolitical power". 14 Foucault's outlining of the governmental shift towards the security and securitization of whole "populations" is especially instructive to the argument I want to make later concerning the biopolitical strategies of US military commanders on the new frontiers of the war on terror. For commanders, the 'population' under their commandincluding especially US troops -presents a dialectic of what Foucault calls "juridical-political" subjects and "technical-political" objects of "management and government".
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In theorising the confluence of 'security, territory, population' in early 1978, Foucault introduced the concept of 'governmentality' for the first time, and indeed acknowledged his preference for "a history of "governmentality"" as a more apposite title for his lecture course that spring. 'Governmentality' was formulated as both a "problematic" that marks the entry of the "modern state in a general technology of power", but also as an analytical tool that involves a "methodological principle" of going behind or outside the 'state' (a move away, in other words, from an "institutional-centric" approach) to conceive of a wider perspective on "the technology of power". 16 'Governmentality', for Foucault, is understood first and foremost as an assemblage of "institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, calculations, and tactics" that capacitate a form of power that "has the population as its target, political economy as its major form of knowledge, and apparatuses of security as its essential technical instrument". 17 And the era of modernity is marked not by the state's "takeover" of society but rather by how the state became gradually "administrative" and "governmentalized" and "controlled by apparatuses of security". 18 Foucault's envisioning of a more governmentalized and securitized modernity, framed by a ubiquitous architecture of security, speaks on various levels to the contemporary US military's efforts in the war on terror, but I want to mention three specifically, which I draw upon through the course of the paper. First, in the long war in the Middle East and Central Asia, the US military actively seeks to legally facilitate both the 'circulation' and 'conduct' of a target population: its own troops. This may not be commonly recognized in biopolitical critiques of the war on terror but, as will be seen later, the Judge Advocate General Corps has long been proactive in a 'juridical' form of warfare, or lawfare, that sees US troops as 'technical-biopolitical' objects of management whose 'operational capabilities' on the ground must be legally enabled. Secondly, as I have explored elsewhere, the US military's 'grand strategy of security' in the war on terror -which includes a broad spectrum of tactics and technologies of security, including juridical techniques -has been relentlessly justified by a power/knowledge assemblage in Washington that has successfully scripted a neoliberal political economy argument for its global forward presence. 19 Securitizing economic volatility and threat and regulating a neoliberal world order for the good of the global economy are powerful discursive touchstones registered perennially on multiple forums in Washington -from the Pentagon to the war colleges, from IR and Strategic Studies policy institutes to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees -and the endgame is the legitimization of the military's geopolitical and biopolitical technologies of power overseas. 20 Finally, Foucault's conceptualization of a 'society of security' is marked by an urge to 'govern by contingency', to 'anticipate the aleatory', to 'allow for the evental'. 21 It is a 'security society' in which the very language of security is promissory, therapeutic and appealing to liberal improvement. The lawfare of the contemporary US military is precisely orientated to plan for the 'evental', to anticipate a series of future events in its various 'security zones' -what the Pentagon terms 'Areas of Responsibility' or 'AORs' (see figure 1) . 22 These AORs equate, in effect, to what Foucault calls "spaces of security", comprising "a series of possible events" that must be securitized by inserting both "the temporal" and "the uncertain". 23 And it is through preemptive juridical securitization 'beyond the battlefield' that the US military anticipates and enables the necessary biopolitical modalities of power and management on the ground for any future interventionary action. 
AORs and the 'milieu' of security
For CENTCOM Commander General David Petraeus, and the other five US regional commanders across the globe, the 'population' of primary concern in their respective AORs is the US military personnel deployed therein. For Petraeus and his fellow commanders, US ground troops present perhaps less a collection of "juridical-political" subjects and more what Foucault calls "technicalpolitical" objects of "management and government". 25 In effect, they are tasked with governing "spaces of security" in which "a series of uncertain elements" can unfold in what Foucault terms the "milieu". 26 What is at stake in the 'milieu' is "the problem of circulation and causality", which must be anticipated and planned for in terms of "a series of possible events" that need to "be regulated within a multivalent and transformable framework". 27 And the "technical problem" posed by the eighteenth-century town planners Foucault has in mind is precisely the same technical problem of space, population and regulation that US military strategists and Judge Advocate General Corps kill. The JAG's milieu is a "field of intervention", in other words, in which they are seeking to "affect, precisely, a population". 29 To this end, securing the aleatory or the uncertain is key. As
Michael Dillon argues, central to the securing of populations are the "sciences of the aleatory or the contingent" in which the "government of population" is achieved by the regulation of "statistics and probability". 30 As he points out elsewhere, you "cannot secure anything unless you know what it is", and therefore securitization demands that "people, territory, and things are transformed into epistemic objects". 31 And in planning the milieu of US ground forces overseas, JAGs translate regional AORs into legally-enabled grids upon which US military operations take place. This is part of the production of what Matt Hannah terms "mappable landscapes of expectation"; 32 and to this end, the aleatory is anticipated by planning for the 'evental' in the promissory language of securitization.
The ontology of the 'event' has recently garnered wide academic engagement. Randy Martin, for example, has underlined the evental discursive underpinnings of US military strategy in the war on terror; highlighting how the risk of future events results in 'preemption' being the tactic of their securitization. 33 Naomi Klein has laid bare the powerful event-based logic of 'disaster capitalism'; 34 while others have pointed out how an ascendant 'logic of premediation', in which the future is already anticipated and "mediated", is a marked feature of the "post-9/11 cultural landscape". 35 But it was Foucault who first cited the import of the 'evental' in the realm of biopolitics. He points to the "anti-scarcity system" of seventeenth-century Europe as an early exemplar of a new 'evental' biopolitics in which "an event that could take place" is prevented before it "becomes a reality". 36 To this end, the figure of 'population' becomes both an 'object', "on which and towards which mechanisms are directed in order to have a particular effect on it", but also a 'subject', "called upon to conduct itself in such and such a fashion". 37 Echoing Foucault, David Nally usefully argues that the emergence of the "era of bio-power" was facilitated by "the ability of 'government' to seize, manage and control individual bodies and whole populations". 38 And this is part of Michael Dillon's argument about the "very operational heart of the security dispositif of the biopolitics of security", which seeks to 'strategize', 'secure', 'regulate' and 'manipulate' the "circulation of species life". 39 For the US military, it is exactly the circulation and regulation of life that is central to its tactics of lawfare to juridically secure the necessary legal geographies and biopolitics of its overseas ground presence.
US forward presence in the war on terror: the enduring import of 'land power'
In considering the US military's legal tactics to empower its specifically 'biopolitical project of security' overseas, it is important to firstly sketch out the recent historical geographical evolution of the contemporary 'milieu' of US ground forces abroad -or what some refer to as the American 'leasehold empire'. 40 In doing so, I want to especially underline the evolving import of 'land power' -defined by 'land access', not territorial control -increasingly identified by military strategists in Komer communicated in Congress, Persian Gulf countries "most emphatically do not want formal security arrangements with us". 43 By the time CENTCOM came into being in 1983,
'prepositioning' at sea of military arsenals, logistical supports and subsistence supplies was the principal US national security strategy overseas. 44 However, a marked concern of contemporary military planners in Washington was that prepositioning on ships was ultimately a limited war strategy on its own; particularly for the new military thinking behind 'rapid deployment forces'. A range of government advisory think-tanks in strategic studies lamented the perennial bigger challenge: the 'problem of access'. Jeffrey Record, at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, for example, saw "[s]ecure military access ashore in the Persian Gulf" as essential for US foreign policy in the region. 45 For Record, the imperative of 'land access' was clear:
To get ashore, intervention forces must have access to ports, airfields, and other reception facilities. To stay ashore, they require continued access to proximate logistical support bases. The U.S. overseas basing structure must serve both in the near term and for decades to come […] any base structuring cannot be designed to deal only with the threats of today. The base structure we develop in the near future must enable us to meet the threats that will emerge over the next quarter century and beyond. 52 And the commission were at pains to underline, in particular, the imperative of "maintaining a forward presence" for CENTCOM's geopolitical and geoeconomic mission. 53 A year after the review, the then CENTCOM Director of Logistics Major General Brian Geehan outlined how the command supported a staggering 128 operating bases across its AOR; 54 and the concentration of these mirror some of the key nodes in the political economy of oil production in the Persian Gulf.
Apart from the operational infrastructure necessary to sustain the ongoing wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the bulk of CENTCOM's long-term facilities architecture on the ground is in the energy-rich GCC countries of the Arabian Peninsula (see table 1 ). But all of its 'land power' must still be secured and capacitated by extending the architecture and operation of the US military's biopolitical power on the ground. This is where biopolitics merges with geopolitics.
The US military's geostrategic forward presence in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere becomes only fully realised when its 'geopolitical operational capacity' is paralleled by a 'biopolitical operational capacity' on the ground. The latter must be enabled by a legal architecture allowing for, and governing, land access, troop circulation and conduct. This is the "toxic combination of geopolitics and biopolitics" that Michael Dillon has in mind when he observes the securitization practices of the war on terror. 62 For Dillon, the "geopolitics of security" revolve around the space of "territory", while the "biopolitics of security" revolve around the space of "population", yet both are indelibly intertwined. 63 Dillon's observation has been echoed by many. For Derek Gregory, for example, "biopolitics is not pursued outside the domain of sovereign power but is instead part of a protracted struggle over the right to claim, define and exercise sovereign power". 64 Of course, it could be argued that geo-politics has always centrally involved bio-politics too and that any recent drawing out of the multiple overlaps between the two simply reflects inadequate prior definitions of both classical and critical geopolitics. 65 In any case, what undoubtedly remains a challenge is the task of revealing and expounding how biopolitical strategies "relate to broader scale issues such as geopolitics and national economic and political policy, and vice versa". 66 It is this theorizing of the complex relations between 'micro' and 'macro' scales of power that is key to Schlosser's call to "avoid dualistic notions of bio-political and sovereign power". 67 Reflecting on the character of late modern war, Derek Gregory draws a useful distinction between the 'object-ontology' of traditional geopolitics, with its customary territorial concerns, and the 'event-ontology' of contemporary biopolitics, where battlefields are "composed of events rather than objects" and biopolitical arguments are concerned with making interventionary military violence "appear to be intrinsically therapeutic". 68 The battle zones of the war on terror may well be "visibly and viscerally alive with death" (when, as Gregory observes, 'biopolitics' becomes 'necropolitics') but the US military are adept at navigating such potentially damning biopolitical registers in its dealings with the media. Long scripted geopolitical registers quickly become mobilised at press briefings, which reinstate "optical detachment" by reductively re-mapping battle spaces back into "an abstract geometry of points". 69 Discursively, the US military is certainly attuned to an expedient entwining of its biopolitical and geopolitical operations. And as I argue below, this discernible conflation of biopolitical and geopolitical strategies also applies to the material securitization practices of the US military as well.
Juridical warfare: forward deployment beyond the battlefield
Nearly two centuries ago, Prussian military strategist, Carl von Clausewitz, observed how war is merely a "continuation of political commerce" by "other means". 70 Today, the lawfare of the US military is a continuation of war by legal means. Indeed, for US Deputy Judge Advocate General, Major General Charles Dunlap, it "has become a key aspect of modern war". 71 For Dunlap and his colleagues in the JAG corps, the law is a "force multiplier", as Harvard legal scholar, David Kennedy, explains: it "structures logistics, command, and control"; it "legitimates, and facilitates" violence; it "privileges killing"; it identifies legal "openings that can be made to seem persuasive", promissory, necessary and indeed therapeutic; and, of course, it is "a communication tool" too because defining the battlefield is not only a matter of "privileging killing", it is also a "rhetorical claim". 72 Viewed in this way, the law can be seen to in fact "contribute to the proliferation of violence rather than to its containment", as Eyal Weizman has instructively shown in the case of recent Israeli lawfare in Gaza. 73 In the US wars in Iraq, Afghanistan and broader war on terror, the Department of Defense has actively sought to legalize its use of biopolitical violence against all those deemed a threat. Harvey Rishikof, the former Chair of the Department of National Security Strategy at the National War College in Washington, recently underlined 'juridical warfare' (his preferred designation over 'lawfare') as a pivotal "legal instrument" for insurgents in the asymmetric war on terror. 74 For
Rishikof and his contemporaries, juridical warfare is always understood to mean the legal strategies of the weak 'against' the United States; it is never acknowledged as a legal strategy 'of' the United For CENTCOM, securing SOFAs with various Middle Eastern countries has been a critical element of theater strategy since the early 1980s. 96 Since the war on terror began, however, the command has broadened negotiations with various countries in its AOR to formalize military ties.
Uzbekistan is one such country. Just three weeks after the September 11 attacks, "concerted negotiations involving teams of CENTCOM JAGs and State Department lawyers" culminated in the Uzbeks signing a crucial SOFA for the US military, which permitted US forces access to Uzbekistani territory and airspace in preparation for the then imminent attack on Afghanistan. 97 This was the first action in the war on terror -on the legal battlefield. The US has since signed defense pacts and SOFA agreements with various other allies in its long war against terrorism, including Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and Djibouti. 98 The most important element of any SOFA is the establishment of the legal jurisdiction within which foreign armed personnel operate in host countries. SOFAs, in effect, define the "legal status of the foreign troops" by "setting forth the rights and responsibilities between the basing and hosting power with regard to such matters as criminal and civil jurisdiction". 99 In the war on terror, the Bush administration consistently signalled its intentions to exempt US forces from accountability to the jurisdiction of both host governments and international law. 100 defense strategy", which revolved around developing "rapidly deployable capabilities" worldwidecapabilities that rely upon legal-biopolitical technologies of power. 103 Feith outlined the necessary lawfare required to facilitate such a grandiose strategy:
For this deployability concept to work, US forces must be able to move smoothly into, through, and out of host nations, which puts a premium on establishing legal and support arrangements […] We are negotiating or planning to negotiate with many countries legal protections for US personnel, through
Status of Forces Agreements and agreements (known as Article 98 agreements) limiting the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court with respect to our forces' activities.
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Feith intimated too the financial trade-off for countries willing to participate: "we are putting in place so-called cross-servicing agreements so that we can rapidly reimburse countries for support they provide to our military operations". 105 Like all warfare, 'juridical warfare' pays someone.
The rapid deployability concept was officially codified with the publication and report to
Congress of the Global Defense Posture Review in 2004. 106 Therein, "bilateral and multilateral legal arrangements" are underlined as critical components of "global defense posture", which allow for the "necessary flexibility and freedom of action to meet 21st-century security challenges".
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Defense Under Secretary Feith's previously announced design to bypass international law and specifically the International Criminal Court in future negotiations of access agreements is also explicitly signalled. 108 The 2005 National Defense Strategy further reinforced the US unilateral position; its bold warning that "our strength as a nation will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism" to make live'. 120 And for Mark Neocleous, (neo)liberalism's fetishization of 'security' -as both a discourse and a technique of government -has resulted in a world defined by anti-democratic technologies of power. 121 In the case of the US military's forward deployment on the frontiers of the war on terror -and its juridical tactics to secure biopolitical power thereat -this has been made possible by constant reference to a neoliberal 'project of security' registered in a language of 'endless emergency' to 'secure' the geopolitical and geoeconomic goals of US foreign policy. have argued above that it can. If, as David Kennedy points out, the "emergence of a global economic and commercial order has amplified the role of background legal regulations as the strategic terrain for transnational activities of all sorts", this also includes, of course, 'warfare'; and for some time, the US military has recognized the "opportunities for creative strategy" made possible by proactively waging lawfare beyond the battlefield. 125 As Walter Benjamin observed nearly a century ago, at the very heart of military violence is a "lawmaking character". 126 And it is this 'lawmaking character' that is integral to the biopolitical technologies of power that secure US geopolitics in our contemporary moment. US lawfare focuses "the attention of the world on this or that excess" whilst simultaneously arming "the most heinous human suffering in legal privilege", redefining horrific violence as "collateral damage, self-defense, proportionality, or necessity". 127 It involves a mobilization of the law that is precisely channelled towards "evasion", securing classified Status of Forces Agreements and "offering at once the experience of safe ethical distance and careful pragmatic assessment, while parcelling out responsibility, attributing it, denying iteven sometimes embracing it -as a tactic of statecraft and war".
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Since the inception of the war on terror, the US military has waged incessant lawfare to legally securitize, regulate and empower its 'operational capacities' in its multiples 'spaces of security' across the globe -whether that be at a US base in the Kyrgyz Republic or in combat in
Iraq. I have sought to highlight here these tactics by demonstrating how the execution of US geopolitics relies upon a proactive legal-biopolitical securitization of US troops at the frontiers of the American 'leasehold empire'. For the US military, legal-biopolitical apparatuses of security enable its geopolitical and geoeconomic projects of security on the ground; they plan for and legally condition the 'milieux' of military commanders; and in so doing they render operational the pivotal spaces of overseas intervention of contemporary US national security conceived in terms of 'global governmentality'. 129 In the US global war on terror, it is lawfare that facilitates what Foucault calls the "biopolitics of security" -when life itself becomes the "object of security". 130 For the US military, this involves the eliminating of threats to 'life', the creating of operational capabilities to 'make live' and the anticipating and management of life's uncertain 'future'.
Some of the most key contributions across the social sciences and humanities in recent years have divulged how discourses of 'security', 'precarity' and 'risk' function centrally in the governing dispositifs of our contemporary world. 131 In a society of (in)security, such discourses have a profound power to invoke danger as "requiring extraordinary action". 132 In the ongoing war on terror, registers of emergency play pivotal roles in the justification of military securitization strategies, where 'risk', it seems, has become permanently binded to 'securitization'. As Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster point out, the "perspective of risk management" seductively effects practices of military securitization to be seen as necessary, legitimate and indeed therapeutic. 133 US tactics of liberal lawfare in the long war -the conditioning of the battlefield, the sanctioning of the privilege of violence, the regulating of the conduct of troops, the interpreting, negating and utilizing of international law, and the securing of SOFAs -are vital security dispositifs of a broader 'risksecuritization' strategy involving the deployment of liberal technologies of biopower to "manage dangerous irruptions in the future". 134 It may well be fought beyond the battlefield in "a war of the pentagon rather than a war of the spear", 135 but it is lawfare that ultimately enables the 'toxic combination' of US geopolitics and biopolitics defining the current age of securitization.
